



In this paper I illustrate the relations in which experiments stand to hypotheses,
laws, and principles in Immanuel Kant’s natural philosophical methodology.
My aim is not to provide a rational reconstruction of Kant’s philosophy of experi-
ment or to assess its internal coherence, but to illustrate it by contrasting it with an
alternative conception of experiment that had a widespread following in the early
modern period. This is the philosophy of experiment that was first sketched by
Francis Bacon and later developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke.
Needless to say, Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke are neither the first, nor the only
philosophers to comment on the nature and functions of experiments before Kant.
However, Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke provided a fairly elaborated and extremely
influential set of reflections on the nature, types, and functions of experiments.
Their philosophy of experiment embodies a set of beliefs and attitudes – such as the
focus on fact-gathering and the rejection of hypotheses – that were widely held in
the second half of the seventeenth century, among others, by many English natural
philosophers and members of the Royal Society, the Florentine Accademia del
Cimento, and the early French Academy of Sciences. A similar emphasis could be
found in many British and French authors throughout the eighteenth century.1
Sketching a history of the anti-hypotheticalism that characterizes the Bacon-
Boyle-Hooke view of experiment, Larry Laudan claims that it was endorsed by
“most scientists and epistemologists” from the 1720s to the end of the eighteenth
century. Laudan mentions Kant as one of the authors for whom “the method of
hypothesis is fraught with difficulties” (Laudan 1981, p. 10). In contrast to Laudan,
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I will argue that Kant’s view on the relations between experiments on the one hand
and hypotheses, laws, and theories on the other hand, is best seen as an alternative
to the aversion to hypotheses and sharp contrast between experiments and
speculations that characterizes the Bacon-Hoyle-Hooke view of experiment.
Kant often emphasizes the importance of experiments for natural science.
Experiments, together with observations, are “the single road of natural science”
(Kant 1922, vol. 11, p. 142)2 and “the source” of physics (Kant 1936–1938, vol. 22,
p. 331).3 They enable us to discover “the properties of object[s] of outer senses”
(Kant 1922, vol. 11, p. 142, trans. modified) and the laws of nature (Kant 1966f, pp.
8157–9, and 89848). Empirical physics entered “the highway of science” only when
Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl followed “the suggestion of the ingenious Francis
Bacon” (Kant 1781/1787, Bxii; 1980, p. 107) and started performing experiments:
When Galileo rolled balls of a weight chosen by himself down an inclined plane, or when
Torricelli made the air bear a weight that he had previously thought to be equal to that of a
known column of water, or when in a later time Stahl changed metals into calx and then
changed the latter back into metal by first removing something and then putting it back
again, a light dawned on all those who study nature [. . .] (Kant 1781/1787, Bxiii)
Galileo’s, Torricelli’s, and Stahl’s experiments are not only the basis for what
Kant regarded as a scientific revolution (“a sudden revolution in the way of
thinking,” Bxii). They are also the basis for a revolution in metaphysics, which
Kant undertakes in the Critique of Pure Reason. Its method “consists in this: to seek
the elements of pure reason in that which admits of being confirmed or refuted
through an experiment” (Bxviii). Kant’s “experiment of pure reason” (Bxxi n.;
1793, p. 291) aims to set metaphysics on the same “secure path of a science”
(Kant 1781/1787, Bix) on which physics entered thanks to Galileo’s and Torricelli’s
experiments. In the theoretical field, the experiment of pure reason will enable Kant
to explain the nature, extent, and limits of a priori knowledge (Kant 1781/1787,
B6, A3/B7, A57/B81; 1783, p. 276; Seigfried 1989). In the practical field, that
experiment will clear the ground for the new foundations of morality which
Kant articulates in the Critique of Practical Reason (Kant 1781/1787, Bxxiv–xxx;
Sato 2008).
Despite his claims on the importance of experiments, Kant was not an experi-
menter (Adickes 1924–25, vol. 1, pp. 6–11; vol. 2, pp. 484 and 487),4 although he
was aware of many results of the experimental sciences of his day. Kant’s writings do
not contain any accurate experimental report or discussion of the practical aspects of
experiments. The Kantian corpus does not provide any detailed, self-contained
2 Translations are my own for those writings of Kant which have not been translated into English.
All other translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. I have
replaced American spelling with British spelling in quotations.
3 See Kant (1936–1938, vol. 22, pp. 2991–2 and 32932–3303). The expression “study of nature” in
the Opus postumum is often followed by the explanation: “through observation and experiment”
(see e.g. Kant 1936–1938, vol. 22, pp. 32217–18, 32816, 34415, and 34625–26).
4 Kant briefly describes an experiment that he performed in (1747, p. 153).
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discussion of what an experiment is, except for a claim that was customary among
Kant’s German contemporaries (Lambert 1764, vol. 1, pp. 351–53; Erxleben 1772,
}4). This is the claim that, by means of experiments, we intervene in nature, placing
objects in states in which they would not otherwise be (Kant 1980, pp. 102–3).5
By contrast, observations do not modify the state in which observed objects are.
Accordingly, we can perform experiments on animals and the medium-sized objects
that we have at hand, but not on distant stars and planets, because we cannot modify
the state they are in.6
Despite his apparent disinterest in the practical aspects of experiments, Kant
provides reflections on three important topics in the philosophy of experiment.
These are the relations of experiments to hypotheses, laws of nature, and the
heuristic principles that guide scientific inquiry.7 I will reconstruct these relations
in Sects. 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 of the paper, after sketching the Bacon-Boyle-Hooke
conception of experiment in Sect. 7.1.8 Some critical remarks are provided in
Sect. 7.5.9
7.1 Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke
According to Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, the main function of experiments is not
testing theories or enabling us to discover the laws of nature. It is providing data,
factual information on the properties and behaviour of bodies in determinate
circumstances.
5 This text classifies several types of experience, following a schema similar to those of Hennings
(1774, pp. 151–52) and Walch (1775, cols. 1083–84).
6 Nevertheless, Kant often mentions observations and experiments in one breath. See e.g. Kant
(1922, vol. 11, p. 14236); Reflexion (henceforth R) 5645 (1780–88?), vol. 18, p. 2883; Kant
(1936–1938, vol. 21, pp. 1516–17 and 7628–29). Kant often employs the term “experiment” in a
loose sense, to refer to observations, e.g. in (1798b, p. 98; 1966b, p. 611).
7 Kant also has interesting views on the role of theoretical concepts for experimentation. I will not
comment on this topic, as it is discussed in Wartenberg (1992, pp. 242–45). I will not discuss
Kant’s views on the role of experiments for the a priori inquiries that he develops in the first two
Critiques. On this issue, see esp. Seigfried (1989), Gloy (1996, 2009), Sato (2008).
8 I follow Peter Anstey (2005, unpublished).
9 In reconstructing Kant’s views, I will draw not only on the texts that Kant published, but also on
his manuscript notes (the so-called Reflexionen) and on the notes of his lectures. These materials
raise several philological problems: see Conrad (1994). In the face of those problems, when citing
Reflexionen and lecture transcripts, I will mostly rely on statements which can be found in more
than one source: several Reflexionen or lecture transcripts, or Reflexionen alongside Kant’s works
and letters. The following datings are assumed for the lectures on which the lecture transcripts are
based. 1966c, 1966e, 1966f, 1980, and 1998b are based on lectures given from the early 1780s
onwards. 1961 is based on lectures given between 1777 and 1782. 1966b and 1998a are based on
lectures given in several different years, probably including pre-Critical materials. 1966a and
1966d are based on lecture given in the early 1770s.
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Experiments aimed primarily to verify or falsify theories were eschewed
because Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke conceived of natural philosophical inquiry as a
two-stage process (Hooke 1705, p. 7). The first stage was the construction of natural
histories, that is, structured collections of a large number of facts on designated
topics (Boyle 1666). The second stage was the development of theories on the
basis of the information collected. This second stage was to be initiated after
the completion of the first stage (Boyle 1662, p. 12). Compiling natural histories
was an enormous endeavor which would occupy many generations of researchers.
As a consequence, theory construction was seen as a task which could only be
accomplished in a distant future (Parker 1666, pp. 45–46).
To be sure, Boyle and Hooke claimed that it is useful to know the main theories
which are available on a given topic in order to design experiments (Boyle 1666,
p. 2; Hooke 1705, p. 19). However, they were wary of drawing general conclusions
from observations and experimental results. For instance, Boyle regarded the
so-called Boyle’s law as a generalization, observed to be true in specific places,
but he was reticent to say that it is universally valid (Boyle 1662, p. 60).10
Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke held that one should perform experiments in a state of
mind which is as free from theoretical assumptions as possible (e.g. Hooke 1705,
p. 20). Otherwise, one will easily fall prey to the prejudices (the famous Baconian
idola: Bacon 1620, part 1, }61) which often thwart our endeavors to discover truth.
Accordingly, Boyle and Hooke professed themselves adherents of experimental
philosophy.11 They counseled against the premature formulation of theories,
systems, and hypotheses (e.g. Hooke 1665, sig. A412). These were distinctive
marks of speculative philosophy, as the adversary of experimental philosophy
was called (Boyle 1662, p. 12; Hooke 1665, sig. a3, b1; Sprat 1667, p. 341;
Anstey 2005; Gaukroger 2006, pp. 352–451). The most frequent examples of
speculative philosophy were Aristotelian and Epicurean natural philosophy and,
later, Cartesian natural philosophy (Boyle 1666, p. 2).
With their factual and experimental approach, Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke,
together with the members of the Royal Society and the other adherents to the
program of experimental philosophy, gave an extraordinary impulse to the natural
sciences. However, their aversion to speculation and hypotheses eventually
undermined the Baconian research program of constructing natural histories.
In the absence of organic links between experiments and observations on the one
hand, and natural philosophical theories and hypotheses on the other, the mere
accumulation of facts did not lead to the substantial progress in the explanation of
the newly observed phenomena that experimental philosophers were expecting.
It also did not lead to the establishment of corpuscularianism which many
10 Boyle’s law states there is an inverse proportional relationship between the pressure and volume
of a gas in a closed system where the temperature is constant.
11 Baconwas posthumously recruited as the “Patriark of Experimental Philosophy” (Power 1664, p. 82).
12 On the origin of this passage, see Birch (1756–57, vol. 1, pp. 490–91).
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“new philosophers” hoped would replace the traditional Aristotelian matter
theory.13 Therefore, it is not surprising that, after the publication of Newton’s
Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica in 1687, British natural philosophers
were quick to embrace the new Newtonian model of natural philosophical inquiry.
Experiments and observations in the Principia are not aimed at the compilation
of natural histories. They are aimed at the establishment of mathematical and
nomological explanations of natural phenomena. By contrast, determinate nomo-
logical explanations were not central to Bacon’s or Boyle’s natural philosophical
projects. Newton claimed that the principles and laws which are the core of natural
philosophical theories are deduced or induced from the phenomena. However,
Newton did not spell out in detail how this deduction or induction takes place.
Moreover, Newton continued to decry hypotheses and speculation. Like Bacon,
Boyle, and Hooke, Newton “did not feign hypotheses”.14 For Newton, as for Bacon
and Boyle, experiments and hypotheses “were on different sides of the methodo-
logical divide” (Anstey unpublished). By contrast, according to Kant, experimental
activity starts with the formulation of a hypothesis.
7.2 Experiments and Hypotheses
7.2.1 Experiments, Hypotheses, and Preliminary Judgements
Discussing “how we can discover the hidden qualities of natural bodies by means of
experiment”, Kant states:
we must always first presuppose something here (begin with a hypothesis) from which to
begin our course of investigation [. . .] For to venture forth blindly, trusting good luck until
one stumbles over a stone and finds a piece of ore and subsequently a lode as well, is indeed
bad advice for inquiry (Kant 1798a, pp. 223–24, italics added).
Unlike Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, Kant holds that we neither can, nor should
perform experiments in a theoretical void. Starting with a hypothesis is not only
good experimental practice. It is also what every experimenter, more or less con-
sciously, actually does: “[e]very man who makes experiments first makes hypo-
theses, in that he believes that this or that experiment will have these consequences”
(Kant 1966f, p. 889).15
13 Boyle’s endorsement of corpuscularianism is an example of indulgence in the sort of speculative
hypotheses that experimental philosophers officially eschewed. Also, it should be granted that
Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke regarded some experiments as tests for theories and hypotheses. My
claim is only that they did not regard hypothesis-testing as the main function of experiments.
14 See Newton (1687, vol. 2, p. 764; 1714/15, pp. 222–24).
15 See Kant (1998b, p. 377617/18).
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Hypotheses are not only important for experiments. They are the starting point of
every activity which requires one to make judgements on the basis of uncertain
grounds. “Thus a doctor makes hypotheses when he cures the sick[;] he has to
subsume everything under hypotheses, and see whether the consequences that he
now has before his eyes follow therefrom” (Kant 1966a, p. 220). A businessman
makes a hypothesis when he “finds a ground that is sufficient for undertaking
something” (Kant 1966c, pp. 750–51). A general facing the enemy “must
necessarily judge and decide something” on the basis of hypotheses (Kant 1966c,
pp. 750–51).
Bacon or Boyle could object that hypotheses may derive from prejudices and
therefore they must be eschewed. Kant would agree that hypotheses derive from
prejudices. However, he would add that, in line of principle, there is nothing wrong
in having pre-judices, understood in the etymological sense of preliminary
judgements. On the contrary, preliminary judgements are necessary for invention
and discovery:
There has never been an inventor in the world, and there has never been anyone who
invented something, who did not at the same time make a preliminary judgement
concerning his invention and the invented thing. He was not certain of the thing, but the
judgement cleared the path for him to try, and to experiment (Kant 1966a, p. 162, trans.
modified and italics added).16
The hypotheses to be tested by means of experiments are “half-judgements”
(Kant 1966f, p. 862), suppositions, and tentative assumptions about the properties
and existence of objects and the laws and forces to which they are subjected.
Why should we believe that our inquiries always start with hypotheses and
preliminary judgements? Kant’s texts contain two sets of considerations in support
of this claim. First, Kant formulates pragmatic considerations, which are indepen-
dent from his transcendental philosophy. Kant sketches several brief descriptions of
the activities of doctors, judges, miners, inventors, and experimenters. These
descriptions are aimed to yield plausibility to the view that inquiries in all these
fields are based on hypotheses and preliminary judgements.
Second, Kant’s conception of the mind places a great emphasis on the active role
of the human subject in shaping our experience of the world (Kant 1781/1787,
A126). In Kant’s view, we continuously subsume the objects that we come by under
concepts, such as those of substance and causality (B161, B164). We do this by
formulating judgements about those objects (B143), even though we are normally
unaware of this mental activity. If one endorses this view of the mind, it will be
much easier to admit that we constantly frame hypotheses and preliminary
judgements than it would be for those philosophers who deny the existence of
unconscious mental contents. According to Kant, the preliminary judgements and
16 See Kant (1798a, pp. 22314–20 and 4058–11). To be sure, Kant distinguishes between prejudices
in the proper sense (Vorurteile) and preliminary or provisional judgements (vorl€aufige Urteile):
see La Rocca (2003).
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hypotheses which are at the basis of our experiments are part of the continuous
flow of our spontaneous activity of judgement (Kant 1961, p. 2432–33,36; 1998b,
359189–90).
7.2.2 Hypotheses and Induction
Kant’s concise explanations of the notion of hypothesis employ several technical
terms. It is helpful to unpack them in three steps:
1. Hypotheses are judgements that we regard as true: they are “a holding to be true”
[F€urwahrhalten].
2. We hold them to be true because they explain the reasons for given phenomena.
The metaphysics treatises of Kant’s eighteenth-century German predecessors
provided detailed treatments of the notion of reason in connection with the
principle of sufficient reason (e.g. Crusius 1747, }}139–54). Adopting their
terminology, Kant states that hypotheses illustrate the Gr€unde, that is, the causes
or reasons of given phenomena. Having in mind the distinction between suffi-
cient and insufficient reasons (e.g. Crusius 1747, }143), Kant states that the
reason expressed by a hypothesis must be sufficient to explain why the phenom-
ena take place.
3. Hypotheses describe presuppositions [Voraussetzungen] (Kant 1966c, p. 7465;
1998a, p. 14614; 1800a, p. 848). They describe what must be preliminarily
[voraus] posited [gesetzt], that is, exist or take place, for certain phenomena to
take place.
The J€asche Logic expresses all this as follows:
A hypothesis is a holding-to-be-true of the judgement of the truth of a ground for the sake of
its sufficiency for given consequences, or more briefly, the holding-to-be-true of a presup-
position as a ground.
All holding-to-be-true in hypotheses is thus grounded on the fact that the presupposi-
tion, as ground, is sufficient to explain other cognitions as consequences (1800a,
pp. 84–85).17
For example, “I suppose that the earth has cavities, because on the basis of this
[supposition] it is possible to explain how valleys arose; then I suppose the ground,
because on the basis of it one can explain [its] consequences. This is a hypothesis”
(Kant 1966d, p. 440).
The example makes clear that, when we formulate hypotheses, we follow a
pattern of reasoning which leads us from certain events (the consequences) to their
ground (R 2687 [1776–89?], vol. 16, p. 471; Kant 1966c, p. 7465–7). On the face of
17 See e.g. R 2678 (1764–75?), vol. 16, p. 465; R 2690 (ca 1780–89), vol. 16, p. 471; R 2694
(1790–1804), vol. 16, p. 472.
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it, this pattern of reasoning would seem to be an abduction or an inference to the
best explanation. Instead, Kant’s discussions of hypotheses mention induction.
Hypotheses “are not taken to be true apodictically, but per inductionem” (Kant
1966e, p. 558).18 “Induction” is a technical term for Kant. It designates the
ascription of a property to all members of a class, on the ground that it belongs to
some of them.19
Since Kant claims that hypotheses are the result of inductions, and the
conclusions of inductions are universal judgements, Kant must hold that hypotheses
are universal judgements. These are judgements of the form “all S are P”. However,
this claim is implausible. Kant himself makes many hypotheses on the constitution
of individual objects or on the causes of just one event: for instance, the hypothesis
that there is heated matter at the centre of the Earth (Kant 1800b, pp. 259–60; 1966f,
p. 8877–8; 1998b, p. 377). In what follows, I will ignore this difficulty and presup-
pose Kant’s claim that hypotheses are universal judgements derived by induction.
7.2.3 Hypotheses, Certainty, and Probability
The claim that hypotheses are the conclusions of inductive inferences is the basis
for Kant’s further claim that hypotheses cannot be certain.20 They do not enjoy the
high epistemic status that early modern philosophers typically required for a
statement to be part of the body of proper science, or scientia.
In Kant’s vocabulary, to be certain of a statement means to know that it is
necessarily true.21 For Kant, we can never know that a hypothesis is necessarily
true. For universal statements, necessary truth goes hand in hand with “true or
strict” generality, “i.e., in such a way that no exception at all is allowed to be
possible” (Kant 1781/1787, B3–4). However, we cannot know whether there is any
exception to the state of affairs described by a hypothesis.
This is because hypotheses are universal statements established by induction on
the basis of information gathered in the course of experience. However,
18 See an addition (1770 or later) to R 2130, vol. 16, p. 246; 1800a, vol. 9, p. 8515–16.
19 See Kant (1966e, p. 594; 1998b, pp. 476–77; 1800a, pp. 132–33). The inductive pattern of
reasoning which leads to the formulation of hypotheses is described in Kant (1781/1787, A647/
B675).
20 E.g. R 2681 (1776–89?), vol. 16, p. 46910–11; R 2687 (1776–89?), vol. 16, p. 471. More
precisely, hypotheses cannot be apodictically certain. On the distinction between apodictic and
assertoric certainty, see Capozzi (2001, pp. 572–76). By “certainty” I will mean apodictic certainty
in what follows.
21 See Kant (1966e, p. 517): certainty “is awareness of the necessity of truth”. See also Kant
(1966e, p. 530; 1800a, p. 66).
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Experience never gives its judgements true or strict but only assumed and comparative
universality (through induction), so properly it must be said: as far as we have perceived,
there is no exception to this or that rule (Kant 1781/1787, B3, italics added; see A24,
A90/B124).
Experience cannot guarantee that a statement is necessarily true either, because
necessity, together with strict universality, is a “secure” indication “of an a priori
cognition” (B4; see A823/B851).
Kant’s contemporary Johann Georg Daries, among others, held that some
inductions are the source of strictly universal judgements, of whose truth we can
be certain. They are the inductions that are based on the enumeration of all members
of a class (Daries 1776, }135). However, according to Kant, experience never gives
us any guarantee that our enumerations are complete. For every given genus about
which we make a generalization, there could be some members that we have not yet
experienced and that are counterexamples to our generalization. The inductive
employment of reason for devising hypotheses
is not properly constitutive, that is, not such that if one judges in all strictness the truth of the
universal rule assumed as a hypothesis thereby follows; for how is one to know all possible
consequences, which would prove the universality of the assumed principle if they
followed from it? (Kant 1781/1787, A647/B675)
Therefore, “[h]ypotheses always remain hypotheses, that is, presuppositions, whose
complete certainty we can never attain” (Kant 1800a, p. 85).22 They can only be
more or less probable.
7.2.4 The Three Requirements for a Good Hypothesis
Not every hypothesis should be regarded as a possible explanation of natural
phenomena. Kant details three requirements that every hypothesis must satisfy. In
the first place, we must be sure that whatever state of affairs the hypothesis adduces
as an explanation for given phenomena can actually take place (Kant 1781/1787,
A770/B798). To this end, the hypothesis must be consistent with the body of our
knowledge. “If, for example, to explain earthquakes and volcanoes we assume a
subterranean fire, then such a fire must be possible, if not as a flaming body, yet as
a hot one” (Kant 1800a, p. 84; see 1998b, p. 377). Hence, we should not make the
hypothesis that there are flames at the centre of the earth, because combustion
would be impossible due to the lack of air (Kant 1800b, pp. 259–60). However, we
can make the hypothesis that the centre of the earth is composed of heated matter,
because a body can be heated in absence of air.23
22 Based on Kant (1966e, p. 558); see R 2681 (1776–89?), vol. 16, p. 469.
23 Kant emphasizes that hypotheses must be consistent especially with that particular body of
knowledge which is constituted by the “conditions of possible experience” (1781/1787,
A771/B799), outlined in the first Critique.
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In the second place, we must make sure that the events to be explained really
follow from the assumed hypothesis. Otherwise, the hypothesis is “a mere chimera”
(Kant 1800a, p. 85; see 1966e, p. 5596–7; 1998b, p. 378635–37).
24
In the third place, a hypothesis must be sufficient to explain a whole set of
phenomena, without the need to integrate it with further hypotheses.
Thus Tycho Brahe’s hypothesis, for example, did not suffice for the explanation of many
appearances; hence he assumed several new hypotheses to complete it. Now here it is to be
surmised that the assumed hypothesis cannot be the real ground. The Copernican system,
on the other hand, is a hypothesis from which everything can be explained that ought to be
explained therefrom, so far as it has yet occurred to us. Here we do not need any subsidiary
hypotheses (hypotheses subsidiarias) (Kant 1800a, pp. 85–86; see 1781/1787, A774/B802;
1966e, p. 559).
The prohibition to use subsidiary hypotheses prevents natural scientists from
framing a whole system out of hypotheses which integrate each other to form com-
prehensive explanations, but are not systematically related to experiments and
observations. An example of such a system is Descartes’ vortex theory, which for
Locke and Newton was a paradigm example of an unfounded speculative hypo-
thesis (Anstey 2005, pp. 229–31). It is occasionally targeted in the Kantian corpus
as well (Kant 1966a, p. 222; 1763, p. 144).25
Compliance with the three criteria ensures that we do not assume “mere
chimeras” (Kant 1966f, p. 88823), “empty figments of the brain” (1790, p. 46618),
“empty fictions” (1966c, p. 74619), “romances of reason” (1966a, p. 22033) or
“daring adventure[s] of reason” (1790, p. 419 n.) as hypotheses. These are typical
expressions of the anti-hypothetical rhetoric to be found in the writings by Boyle,
Hooke, or Locke (e.g. Locke 1976–89, vol. 4, p. 628). They employed those
expressions in their wholesale rejection of any hypothesis from the current stage
of natural philosophy.
Kant, like his German contemporaries (e.g. Erxleben 1772, }9), employs the same
expressions of seventeenth century British philosophers. However, unlike his British
predecessors, Kant employs those expressionswithin a frameworkwhich is not hostile
to hypotheses per se. Kant states that hypotheses, like castles in the air, are fictions,
but not all fictions must be rejected. The power of imagination, kept “under the
strict oversight of reason” (Kant 1781/1787, A770/B798), can give rise to useful
“heuristic fictions” (1966a, p. 26228). The three criteria laid out above discriminate
castles in the air from heuristic fictions. The task of experiments is determining which
heuristic fictions portray actual states of affairs, rather than mere possibilities.
24 The first Critique adds that we should be able to determine the consequences of a given
hypothesis a priori (Kant 1781/1787, A774/B802). I take this to mean that, when we explain
how certain events follow from the assumed hypothesis, we should show that they follow from it
on the basis of a priori principles, such as the causal law and the law of action and reaction
(see Butts 1961, p. 165). Empirical laws, besides a priori principles, might be involved in the
explanation.
25 A discussion of Kant’s views on hypotheses which is rather different from the reconstruction
provided here can be found in Butts (1962).
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7.3 Experiments and the Laws of Nature
Let us assume that we have a hypothesis which satisfies the three criteria and is
confirmed by experiments. What use shall we make of it? We saw in the introduc-
tion that, according to Kant, experiments help us discover the laws of nature. Laws
of nature are expressed by necessary statements. Kant regards this as an analytic
truth: to say that something is a law is to say that it is necessary.26 Accordingly, in
order to know that a statement expresses a law of nature, we must know that it is
necessarily true. However, experiments cannot confer certainty to a hypothesis,
because experience cannot establish that a statement is necessarily true.27 There-
fore, just by means of experiments, we cannot prove that a hypothesis is a law of
nature (Kant 1783, p. 294).
Does this mean that experiments will never enable us to achieve the purpose they
are meant to serve, that is, discovering the laws of nature? Kant does not draw such a
pessimistic conclusion. He holds that testing hypotheses by means of experiments is
necessary, but not sufficient, to discover the laws of nature. Experimental confirma-
tion of a hypothesis is only the first step toward the discovery of a law of nature.
To illustrate this point, let us consider Copernicus’ heliocentric theory of planets.
Copernicus’ “first thought” was a preliminary judgement: “the observer revolve
[s],” whereas “the stars [. . .] [are] at rest” (Kant 1781/1787, Bxvi). “Copernicus
assumed” this thought “only as a hypothesis” (Bxxii n.) This hypothesis proved to
be superior to the Ptolemaic hypothesis and to Tycho Brahe’s hypothesis. Kant
holds that, unlike the Tychonian hypothesis, the Copernican hypothesis does not
require supplementary hypotheses (Kant 1966e, p. 559; 1800a, pp. 85–86). Unlike
the Ptolemaic hypothesis, the Copernican hypothesis explains all the phenomena.
This confers a high degree of probability to the Copernican hypothesis (Kant 1966f,
p. 887), but it does not make it certain. What made it certain is the fact that it was
subsumed under a body of laws:
The central laws of the motion of the heavenly bodies established with certainty what
Copernicus assumed at the beginning only as a hypothesis, and at the same time they
proved the invisible force (of Newtonian attraction) that binds the universe [. . .]
(Kant 1781/1787, Bxxii n.)
The same applies to the hypotheses that are confirmed by experiments.
Experiments make them probable. The integration with a body of a priori laws
and principles makes them certain. Thus
Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with its principles in one
hand, according to which alone the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and,
in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these principles [. . .]
(Kant 1781/1787, Bxiii, italics added).
26 Kant associates the term “law” to necessity (e.g. 1781/1787, A126) and universality (e.g. 1783,
p. 310). Kant (1781/1787, A126) qualifies laws as objective rules and other passages (e.g. 1783,
p. 301) relate objectivity to necessity and universality.
27 See Sect. 7.2.3.
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What principles must we employ to transform appearances into laws and how
can we carry out this process? To answer this question, we must enter the complex
territory of Kant’s theory of the laws of nature. Two caveats are in place here. First,
my outline will be highly selective. I will reconstruct Kant’s theory only to the
extent which is necessary to understand how experiments enable us to discover new
laws of nature. Second, my comments apply more neatly to Kant’s view of physical
laws than to his view of biological laws. I privilege physical laws because most of
Kant’s references to specific experiments relate to the field of physics, and not to
biology.28
There are laws of nature at three levels. At the first and highest level, we
encounter the principles of pure reason. We can call them transcendental principles.
They are eight highly general statements which describe features of our perception
and features of natural objects and phenomena. For instance, a transcendental
principle which describes features of our perception is: every sensation has a
variable degree of intensity (Kant 1781/1787, B207). A principle which describes
features of natural phenomena is the causal principle: “[a]ll alterations occur in
accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect” (B232). Among the
transcendental principles, those which apply to natural objects and phenomena
extend to physical phenomena and material objects, as well as to psychological
phenomena (Kant 1783, p. 295). For example, the causal principle does not only
apply to the alterations of material objects. It also applies to mental states. Every
change in our mental states is determined by a cause.
According to Kant, the transcendental principles can be proven to be true a
priori, at least given Kant’s peculiar notion of a priori (Kitcher 2000, p. 17). This
means that, although the proofs of the transcendental principles depend on premises
concerning our cognitive capacities, they do not rely on any premise concerning
particular experiences or features of objects that we can only know through
experience. By contrast, a principle will be a posteriori in Kant’s sense if its
proof relies on assumptions concerning particular experiences or features of objects
that we can only know through experience.
Kant prefers to call the transcendental principles principles, rather than laws, in
order to stress that they lie at the basis of the system of our knowledge. To the extent
that they concern natural objects, the transcendental principles are the most basic
laws of nature (Kant 1783, p. 319). “[T]hey are not themselves grounded in higher
and more general cognitions” (Kant 1781/1787, A148/B188).
At the second level, there are the metaphysical principles of natural science.
Among these are Newton’s laws of inertia and of action and reaction. Unlike the
transcendental principles, the metaphysical principles do not apply to psychological
phenomena, but only to material bodies. Like the transcendental principles, the
metaphysical principles are known a priori.
28 Kant also mentions several chemical experiments, but he denies that the empirical
generalizations of chemistry can achieve the status of laws (1786, p. 468).
86 A. Vanzo
This does not mean that experience or experiments are irrelevant to the
metaphysical principles. First, we must have experience of the external world in
order to acquire the concept of material body, without which we cannot even
formulate the metaphysical principles. Second, experience might be necessary
in order to discover them. Kant could well agree that we cannot discover the law
of action and reaction without making appropriate experiences, such as the pendu-
lum experiments that Newton details in the Principia.29 However, those
experiments are not sufficient for us to prove the metaphysical principles. They
cannot be, to use Locke’s famous expression, “Principles that Matter of Fact
justifie” (Locke 1693, p. 248). This is because, being laws, they apply necessarily
to every object that exists in space and time. Yet experience, experiments, and
matters of fact cannot confer necessity to any judgement. Even if we discover
the metaphysical principles empirically, we must prove them a priori, as Kant
attempts to do in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. If no a priori
proof were available, we would have to deny that they are laws in the proper sense
of the term.
At the third level, we find the empirical laws of nature. They apply to specific
material objects and physical phenomena. We discover the empirical laws of nature
a posteriori, on the basis of observations and experiments (Kant 1781/1787, B263).
We can prove them only by making reference to observations or experiments.
Therefore, the empirical laws of nature, unlike the transcendental and metaphysical
principles, are established only a posteriori.
Empirical laws of nature raise the same difficulty that we encountered earlier
with reference to experiments. On the one hand, empirical laws “can only be
known [. . .] empirically” and therefore, at least from the point of view of our under-
standing, “are contingent” (Kant 1790, p. 184, see pp. 179–80). On the other hand,
empirical laws, being laws, must contain an element of necessity. Our understand-
ing must think of them “as laws (i.e., as necessary)” (1790, 184). How can we
confer necessity to laws that we can know “only empirically”? Since necessity
cannot be established a posteriori, it must be established a priori. In Kant’s view, we
have reason to regard empirical rules as necessary laws if we can relate them to the
transcendental and metaphysical principles (Friedman 1992, p. 174). In order to
confer necessity to an empirical rule, we must show that it follows from the a priori
principles, in addition to empirical premises.30 Let us consider three examples to
see how this process unfolds.
29 E.g. Bk. 3, Prop. 6.
30 This combination of [a] empirical and [b] a priori premises is reflected in Kant’s statement
that “the empirical laws can only [. . .] be found [a] by means of experience, and indeed [b] in
accord with its original laws [a priori principles], in accordance with which experience itself first
becomes possible” (1781/1787, A216/B263). Empirical laws can be inferred from the transcen-
dental principles, but not “completely” (B165). “Experience must be added in order to come to
know particular laws at all” (B165).
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1. We have determined certain empirical regularities concerning the melting of
wax and we want to formulate an empirical law of nature. We could then prove
that the statements describing those regularities follow from a priori principles,
such as the causal law and the law of action and reaction, together with empirical
statements describing properties of wax.
2. We have formulated statements describing how a billiard ball moves when it is
hit by other balls. We could then derive those statements from the causal
principle, metaphysical principles, and information on the weight and shape of
billiard balls.
3. Faced with Kepler’s laws of planetary motion, we could prove that they follow
from metaphysical principles such as the law of inertia and the law of action and
reaction (Friedman 1992, pp. 175–80).
In each of these cases, we start from empirical regularities which we have
established a posteriori. Then we attempt to subsume them under a priori principles.
If we succeed in this attempt, we will have reason to regard the statements
describing those regularities as “something radically new” (Friedman 1992, p. 178),
that is, as descriptions of necessary features of reality.31
The process which leads from a hypothesis to an empirical law of nature is
represented in Fig. 7.1. The point of departure for this process is a hypothesis which
is derived by induction. To begin with, we should assess whether the hypothesis
satisfies the three requirements discussed in Sect. 7.2.4. If it does not, we must
abandon it. Otherwise, we must approach it holding, in Kant’s words, experiments
in one hand and principles in the other (Kant 1781/1787, Bxiii). First, we must
perform experiments or carry out observations to confirm or disprove the hypothe-
sis. Then, if the hypothesis is confirmed, we must attempt to relate it to the
principles which are the basis of natural science. If we succeed in doing so, then
the hypothesis could be an empirical law of nature.
I stated that it could be a law of nature, and not that it will certainly be a
law of nature, because other operations may be involved in our search for natural
laws. For instance, we may have to choose between two incompatible hypotheses,
both of which are confirmed by the observational evidence and can be integrated
with a priori principles. Alternatively, we may have to submit our experiments,
hypotheses, and explanations to the scientific community. We may be entitled
to claim that a hypothesis is a law of nature only when some degree of inter-
subjective agreement is reached. This would conform to Kant’s repeated claim
that people’s agreement, and especially the agreement of the learned community,
with our opinions provides a reason to hold them true (Kant 1781/1787,
A820–21/B848–49; 1783, p. 298).
31 Typically, empirical laws outline necessary features of specific natural kinds: see Kreines
(2008).
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7.4 Experiments and Heuristic Principles
In the previous section we have seen that, for Kant, principles play a role after
we perform experiments. They enable us to convert experimentally confirmed
hypotheses into laws of nature. However, there are also principles which play a
Fig. 7.1 Process from
hypotheses to empirical laws
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role before we perform experiments. They are principles that we follow in
order to formulate hypotheses to be tested by means of experiments. When we
perform experiments, “we must always first presuppose something here (begin with
a hypothesis) from which to begin our course of investigation, and this must
come about as a result of principles” (Kant 1798a, p. 223, italics added; see
1942, p. 1991–3).
What principles is Kant referring to? To the extent that we are aware of them, the
transcendental and metaphysical principles are involved in the formulation and
assessment of hypotheses. We should only accept hypotheses that are consistent
with those principles. In addition, three other principles guide the formulation of
hypotheses. They are the principles of homogeneity, specification, and affinity.
Kant calls them the principles of the hypothetical use of reason.
The principle of homogeneity states that “one should not multiply beginnings
(principles) without necessity” (Kant 1781/1787, A652/B680). Kant takes it to
mean that one must always search for higher genera for all the species that one
knows. As an example, Kant mentions the hypothesis that every salt is either an
acid, or an alkali, and the attempts “to regard this distinction as merely a variety or
varied expression of one and the same fundamental material” (A652–53/B680–81).
The principle of homogeneity is a methodological principle which presupposes a
metaphysical principle: namely, that natural entities belong to common kinds.
The principle of specification prohibits one from assuming that there are lowest
species, that is, species which cannot in turn have sub-species. This is a presuppo-
sition of natural inquiry, as Kant explains by taking different types of soil as an
example:
That there are absorbent earths of different species (chalky earths and muriatic earths)
needed for its discovery a foregoing rule of reason that made it a task for the understand-
ing to seek for varieties, by presupposing nature to be so abundant that it presumes them.
For we have an understanding only under the presupposition of varieties in nature, just as
we have one only under the condition that nature’s objects have in themselves a sameness
of kind, because it is just the manifoldness of what can be grasped together under a
concept that constitutes use of this concept and the business of the understanding.
(A657/B685)
The principle of affinity derives from the combination of the principles of
homogeneity and specification. It states that “there is a continuum of forms”
(A659/B687): “there are no species or subspecies that are proximate [. . .], but
intervening species are always possible, whose difference from the first and second
species is smaller than their difference from each other” (A659–60/B687–88; see
A228–29/B281). This appears to be a metaphysical principle, but it has a methodo-
logical significance: one must always allow for the possibility that there are inter-
mediate species between the species that one already knows. In this instance, as was
the case for the two previous principles, we have a methodological prescription
(always look for intermediate species), which depends on a metaphysical presuppo-
sition (there is a continuum of forms).
90 A. Vanzo
The principles of the hypothetical use of reason, like the metaphysical principles
of natural science, are not inductive generalizations that we form on the basis of
experience. We do not derive them from the discovery that known genera have
lower species, that lower species belong to higher genera, and that there are
intermediate species between any two known species. In Kant’s view, we would
not find higher genera, lower species, and intermediate species in the first place,
unless we previously assumed the principles of the hypothetical use of reason
as guides for the formulation of hypotheses (A660/B688). For instance, we perform
experiments to test the hypothesis that several phenomena obey the same law
because we assume that there is a higher genus for every given set of phenomena.32
We do not have to be fully conscious of this assumption in order to formulate
hypotheses and to test them with experiments. We often exercise our mental powers
according to rules of which we are unaware. “The exercise of our powers [. . .] takes
place according to certain rules that we follow, unconscious of them as first, until
we gradually arrive at cognition of them through experiments and lengthy use
of our powers” (Kant 1800a, p. 11; see 1966e, p. 502; 1966f, p. 790). This applies,
for instance, to the rules of grammar, which we discover long time after we started
following them. The same applies to the principles of the hypothetical use of
reason.
Although we often follow these principles unconsciously, Kant does not think
that we always follow them (Kant 1786, p. 472). They “do not say what happens,
i.e., in accordance with which rule our powers of cognition actually perform their
role and how things are judged, but rather how they ought to be judged” (Kant 1790,
p. 182). They are rules or maxims that must guide the formulation of hypotheses
(Kant 1781/1787, A666/B694). Like hypotheses, the principles of the hypothetical
use of reason are “heuristic fictions” (A661/B689) which precede and guide experi-
mental activity.
To be sure, the principles of the hypothetical use of reason are not the sole
presuppositions of experimental activity. Kant argues for the existence of other
regulative principles that direct empirical research. They are: the assumption that
we cannot have sensory perceptions of any absolute or insurmountable temporal or
spatial limits (A508–9/B536–37); the assumption that nature is organized as if it
were designed by an intelligent being (A826/B854); and the assumption that living
beings are constituted as if they obeyed final causes (Kant 1790, p. 387).33 More-
over, the principles of the hypothetical use of reason are not only presuppositions of
experimental activity. They also underlie the systematic organization of cognitions.
We employ those principles when we formulate a hypothesis which explains
32Kant argues that, in order to discover natural laws, we must assume that nature is ordered into
genera and species, in conformity with the principles of the hypothetical use of reason (1790,
p. 185). To show this, Kant explains how the principle of affinity was at work in the reasonings that
lead to Newton’s discovery of universal gravitation (Kant 1781/1787, A662–63/B690–91).
33 See Guyer (1990).
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several phenomena, even if we are unable to perform experiments or observations
to test it. If the hypothesis provides the best explanation of the phenomena, we
should accept it despite the absence of experimental or observational confirmation.
However, if experiments confirm the hypothesis, we have “a powerful reason to
take as well grounded the unity that is hypothetically thought-out” (Kant 1781/
1787, A661/B689).
7.5 Conclusion
According to Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, experiments serve mainly to collect data
in view of the future construction of natural philosophical theories. Experiments
were not typically assigned the function of testing theories and hypotheses. On the
contrary, the experimenter’s prior natural philosophical beliefs and persuasions
were looked upon with suspicion, as potential sources of prejudices which could
contaminate his experimental activity. On the whole, data collection and experi-
mentation were seen as theory-free activities.
By contrast, according to Kant, experiments cannot serve to build a base of data
which are independent from theories. This is because experiments are always
conceived of and carried out in the light of our assumptions, expectations, and
heuristic principles. These assumptions and principles depend in part on the nature
of the human mind and in part on the experimenter’s convictions and purposes.
They give rise to preliminary judgements and hypotheses which guide us in the
design and performance of experiments.
Kant’s emphasis on the importance of preliminary judgements and hypotheses
for experiments goes hand in hand with his denial of the Baconian view that
prejudices always play a negative function. According to Kant, prejudices
(or more precisely, preliminary judgements) are indispensable for many human
activities, including experimentation. However, it is necessary to test and assess
them in order to either reject them as false, or else to transform them from mere
opinions to certain truths.
On the whole, compared with Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke, Kant has elaborate
views on the one hand, on how our theoretical and pre-theoretical assumptions bear
on experimental practice, and on the other hand, on how the results of experimental
activity can be integrated within the body of our theories in order to advance our
knowledge of nature. However, Kant seems to have overstated the dependence of
experiments on theories.
First, pace Kant, some experiments are performed in absence of a clear theoreti-
cal framework. Their aim is not testing hypotheses, but exploring new areas of
inquiry or circumscribing new phenomena (Steinle 1997). Kant must have read the
discussion of these exploratory experiments in a work that he knew well, Johann
Heinrich Lambert’s New Organon (1764, vol. 1, p. 355). However, Kant never
discusses exploratory experiments.
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Second, as a consequence of his disregard for exploratory experiments, Kant
overlooks the benefits of the creative interplay of experiments designed to test theories
and hypotheses with experiments which have a life of their own. Bacon, Boyle, and
Hooke also overlooked the benefits of that interplay, but for the opposite reason:
namely, because they focused too much on experiments having a life of their own.
Third, some experiments test hypotheses which contrast with our currently
accepted theories. They lead us to replace them with new theories, incompatible
with the previous ones. Kant does not provide any account of how these revolution-
ary experiments lead to theory change or revision.34 On the contrary, he requires
that our hypotheses are coherent with the body of our previous knowledge35
and that experimental results are integrated within a given system, based on the a
priori foundations of natural science.36
In response to this criticism, Kant could emphasize that exploratory and revolu-
tionary experiments are never wholly independent from our theoretical and pre-
theoretical beliefs and hypotheses. However, he should have acknowledged that they
enjoy a certain degree of freedom from our theoretical assumptions. This makes them
more than handmaids to theory, hypothesis-testing procedures, or preliminaries to
the addition of new laws of nature to a static, ever-growing body of natural philosophi-
cal knowledge, firmly resting on unshakable Newtonian foundations.
As is well known, developments in science have shaken those foundations and
made space for more dynamic conceptions of scientific progress. These conceptions
make it easier than it would have been for Kant to accommodate the interaction
between theory-testing experiments and exploratory experiments and to explain the
roles of experiments for theory change and revision. Arguably, the evolution of
Kant’s philosophical views points in this direction. The completeness and coherence
of the system of natural science becomes more and more a regulative ideal when
Kant moves from the Newtonian focus of theMetaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science to the thorny status of teleological biological explanations in the Critique
of the Power of Judgement and the reconsideration of chemistry in the Opus
Postumum. Yet despite these developments, Kant never retracted the claim that he
uncovered and enumerated the definitive a priori foundations of natural science.
At any rate, in order to acknowledge the roles of experiments for exploring new
territories and establishing new theories, it was necessary to highlight the existence
of fecund relations between experiments and theories. Highlighting these relations
is a significant contribution of Kant’s philosophy of experiment, especially if
compared with the views of his British predecessors.37
34 On the forms of scientific progress that are compatible with Kant’s views, see Malzkorn (2000).
35 See Sect. 7.2.4.
36 See Sect. 7.3.
37 In acknowledging these relations, Kant could rely on the reflections of his German predecessors,
from Wolff to Lambert. Reconstructing them and the extent to which they anticipate Kant’s
reflections is a task that I hope to take up on another occasion. For valuable comments on previous
versions of this paper, I would like to thank Peter Anstey, Juan Manuel Gomez, Alan Musgrave,
and Kirsten Walsh. The paper benefited from very helpful discussions of audiences at Budapest,
Padua, and Sydney.
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